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 Determinants of the dynamics of the European Union 
integration process: An ordered logit approach 
Abstract 
This research has three main aims: firstly, to empirically analyse the determinants of 
different levels of integration by re-examining the evidence presented by Baier and 
Bergstrand (2004) in the JIE 64 (1); secondly, to analyse the importance of additional 
factors, in particular socio-political factors. Finally, to analyse the dynamics of the 
European Union integration process. The results show that although economic and 
geographical factors are the most important explanatory factors for the probability of 
regional integration agreement formation or enhancement, socio-political variables also 
contribute to explain the formation of regional integration agreements. Democracies and 
countries with a higher level of economic freedom are more likely to form or enhance 
RIAs. 
Keywords: Regional integration agreements, European Union, discrete choice models, 
trade flows, socio-political factors, natural partners. 
JEL classification: F11, F12, F15 
1. Introduction 
A major concern in the traditional literature on the formation of free trade areas (FTAs) 
has been whether these areas generate welfare gains for the individual countries that 
engage in these processes. Since the 1950s (Viner, 1950), many authors have 
contributed to this debate, especially in the 1990s when studies based on the gravity 
model proliferated (Frankel, Stein and Wei –FSW-, 1995, 1996, 1998). However, none 
of this research has attempted to evaluate the determinants of FTA formation.  
Only recently have Baier and Bergstrand (2004) developed the first theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the economic determinants of FTA formation. They provide an 
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 economic benchmark for future political economy models to explain the determinants 
of FTAs. They find evidence showing that pairs of countries will be more likely to form 
FTAs if they share the following characteristics: a) they are geographically close to each 
other, b) they are remote from the rest of the world, c) they are large and of a similar 
economic size, d) the difference of capital-labour between them is large and e) the 
difference of their capital-labour ratios is small compared to the rest of the world. Baier 
and Bergstrand (BB) only consider whether or not each pair of countries is involved in 
an FTA. Therefore the variable they attempt to explain is binary and takes the values 
zero and one. BB (2005) show the importance of treating FTAs as endogenous when the 
determinants of trade flows are analysed. They show that when the endogeneity of the 
FTA variables is taken into account in gravity models, their effect on trade flows is 
quintupled.  
In this paper, we extend BB’s work in two ways: firstly, we address the importance of 
additional economic, geographical and socio-political variables as determinants of 
regional integration agreements (RIAs). Secondly, we investigate the determinants of 
five different levels of integration between pairs of countries: Preferential trade 
agreement (PTA), free trade agreement (FTA), customs union (CU), single market (SM) 
and monetary union (MU).  
We begin by replicating BB’s empirical work to verify the robustness of their results 
with an alternative data set and by adding socio-political variables to the model. We 
then estimate an ordered logit model (instead of a binary probit) with the same 
explanatory variables considered by BB to benchmark our extension to their original 
work. Finally, the ordered logit is estimated with additional economic, geographical and 
socio-political variables. The economic variables we consider are economic size, 
income differences and factor endowment differences. Adjacency and landlocked status 
4 
 are added to BB’s list of geographical variables. The socio-political variables are a 
shared language, political regime, level of economic freedom and trade barriers.  
We find that: (i) BB’s results are fairly robust, although the coefficient signs are 
reversed for the K-L difference variable with our database; (ii) the additional 
characteristics considered have a significant impact on the probability of an RIA being 
formed; (iii) socio-political factors are less important than economic and geographical 
factors, but still significant in explaining RIA formation or enhancement.  
To our knowledge, only a few authors have studied the determinants of regional 
integration who take into account the degree of integration. Wu (2004) considered 
different levels of integration ranked across countries. However, her paper focuses on 
the role that political and economic uncertainty plays in explaining RIA formation and 
her results are not directly comparable to Baier and Bergstrand since she includes 
different explanatory variables in her model. Wu shows that countries’ per capita 
income, democracy and geographical characteristics appear to be the best indicators of 
the probability of participation in a certain level of RIA in the period 1987-1998. 
Surprisingly, Wu (2004) does not consider the distance variable as a determinant of RIA 
formation. This omission may influence the results obtained for other variables since the 
model is not well specified. Endoh (2006) derived a theoretical framework to explain 
the incentives of countries to conclude an RIA. The author stated that “the economic 
and political characteristics of determining the existence or absence of PTAs are quite 
different from those of FTAs and CUs”.1 Heterogeneity among RIAs is taken into 
account in the empirical analysis, in which two different dependent variables are 
considered (FTAs/CUs based on GATT Article XXIV and all the PTAs including other 
types of agreement based on the Enabling Clause). The methodology used to estimate is 
                                                 
1 Endoh, 2006, page 769. 
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 a binary logit model. Finally, Vicard (2006) relates economic and political integration, 
and proves that the determinants of regional integration differ according to the type of 
regional integration agreement. The heterogeneity in the nature of RIAs is introduced by 
taking into account two integration levels: shallow RIAs (PTAs and FTAs) and deep 
RIAs (CUs and CMs). The author runs three different regressions, one for all RIAs, one 
for shallow RIAs and one for deep RIAs. Then, a binary probit model is estimated. 
Unlike these authors, we take on a more difficult question: Why deeper integration? 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 stylised facts in 
relation to the reasons why countries decide to engage in deeper economic integration 
are discussed. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and the econometric model. 
Section 4 describes the data, the variables and the hypothesis to be tested. Section 5 
discusses the estimation results. The model in Section 6 is estimated for an additional 
sample, including data for the EU-27 from 1999 to 2007, thus enabling dynamic issues 
to be also analysed. Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions.  
2. Stylised facts 
Decisions concerning economic integration are controversial in most cases; there are 
global benefits, but they are unevenly distributed among winners and losers. The best 
real example of deep economic integration is the European integration process. 
Although the initial goal was to avoid undesirable wars within the continent, a much 
more ambitious vision was endorsed over the years, that being one of the main goals: 
the completion of the European Monetary Union. Deep integration of this form has 
generated clear benefits to European citizens in terms of welfare and growth. 
However, since the recent accession of ten new member states in 2004 and two more in 
2007, the European Union (EU) has witnessed an intense discussion regarding its 
future. The central question of the debate is featured in the title of the report launched 
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 by the Constructing Europe Network (EU-CONSENT): “Wider Europe, deeper 
integration? A common theoretical framework”. The main aim of the EU-CONSENT is 
to elaborate the scenarios and strategies for the future of European integration and to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of each of them, based on the triangle of deepening, 
widening and completing. Over the years, the EU has been considered a “club” with 
open membership, but as integration deepens, the entry conditions become more 
exhaustive. Although uniformity was a rule until recently, the monetary union as well as 
other specific agreements (Schengen agreement on border controls) were restricted only 
to some members.  
The debate concerning deep integration is also open in North America (Campbell, 2005) 
and Asia (Wyplosz, 2006). In both cases the expected benefits of deeper integration are 
only seen as uncertain, whereas the political-costs are high. 
3. Theoretical framework and econometric model 
3.1. The theory 
Although deep regional integration can proceed along different lines, according to 
McKinnon (1979) it should start with domestic goods market liberalisation, followed by 
external trade integration, and should proceed with domestic financial market 
liberalisation and international capital integration. We define the concept of “deeper 
regional integration” in relation to the level of economic integration stated by Viner 
(1950). Therefore, deeper RIAs are those involving a higher level of economic 
integration. This paper is related to recent research in regional integration that 
investigates why countries enter an RIA, although it also focuses on the question of why 
countries engage in deeper integration processes. 
What are the reasons why countries engage in deeper integration?  Until recently the 
research in this field focused on the effects of regionalism and disregarded the economic 
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 and political factors which explain the presence or absence of free trade agreements 
between pairs of countries. BB (2004) were the first authors to theoretically explain the 
likelihood of PTAs between pairs of countries using only economic and geographical 
factors. Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2002) considered this problem from a 
political-economy point of view, and demonstrated that more democratic countries had 
displayed a greater likelihood of concluding PTAs than other countries. In addition, 
Endoh (2006) derived a theoretical framework to explain the incentives of countries to 
conclude an RIA. The author stated that the economic and political characteristics of 
determining the existence or absence of PTAs are quite different from those of FTAs 
and CUs. The author derives seven testable hypotheses, of which Hypothesis 3 states 
that the possibility of concluding a PTA by a pair of countries increases as their quality 
of governance ameliorates. 
Four categories of FTA determinants can be inferred from this theoretical framework: 
economic geography factors, intra-industry trade and inter-industry trade determinants 
and socio-political factors.  They will all be considered in the empirical analysis. 
3.2. Econometric model  
Probit and logit models have often been used to model discrete choice phenomena (Ben-
Akiva and Lerman, 1985). In this context, a logit model is a discrete choice system 
interpreted as a particular case of a model, the dependent variable of which is subject to 
limited variability, is not continuous and takes a finite number of values (McFadden and 
Train, 2000; Koppelman and Wen, 1998). This type of system describes the behaviour 
of economic agents in terms of probability. The probability of a specific selection is 
assigned to a series of explanatory values. This series of values gathers the 
characteristics of decision-makers and/or the attributes of the various choice 
alternatives. 
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 Multinomial logit or probit models are used when there are more than two alternatives. 
However, they fail to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable used in 
this research. We aim to model the choice of sequential binary decisions, the first 
consisting of a pair of countries that either sign a preferential trade agreement (PTA) or 
do not. Once a country comes to a bilateral agreement, the next decision will be whether 
to take a further step and go to a higher level of integration. Therefore, the model 
objective is to take a series of binary decisions, each consisting of the decision of 
whether to accept the current value or to “take one more”.2 In this context, Amemiya 
(1975) describes a model that applies to ordered discrete alternatives, such as the 
number of cars owned by a household. This is based on the assumption of local (as 
opposed to global) utility maximisation. The decision-maker stops when the first local 
optimum is reached. Economic agents must choose between two sequential options, and 
their selection depends on their characteristics and their environment. In accordance 
with the characteristics of our dependent variable, an ordered logit model was specified 
in our study.  
The model is built around a latent regression in the same way as the binomial probit 
model. An observed ordinal variable, Y, is a function of an unobserved latent variable, 
Y*, which represents the difference in utility levels from an action. The continuous 
latent variable Y* has a number of threshold points, and the value of the observed 
variable Y depends on whether or not a particular threshold is crossed. In the present 
analysis we assume that five different integration levels can be reached, therefore the 
number of thresholds is five, 
Yi = 0 if Y*i ≤ δ1 
                                                 
2 There are instances in which the RIAs are moribund, then countries can decide to “take one less”. This 
is not the case in the data being looked at. 
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 Yi = 1 if δ1 ≤ Y*i ≤ δ2 
Yi = 2 if δ2 ≤ Y*i ≤ δ3         (1) 
Yi = 3 if δ3 ≤ Y*i ≤ δ4 
Yi = 4 if δ4 ≤ Y*i ≤ δ5 
Yi = 5 if Y*i ≥ δ5 
where the δs are the unknown parameters to be estimated. Threshold 1 denotes that a 
pair of countries engages in a PTA, threshold 2 denotes an FTA, threshold 3 is a CU, 
threshold 4 is an SM, and threshold 5 represents an MU. 
The continuous latent variable is given by, 
∑
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where Xki are the explanatory variables, βk are the coefficients and εi is the random 
disturbance term that is assumed to be independent of X and has a logistic distribution.  
The ordered logit model estimates, 
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Once the βk parameter and the M-1 δs have been estimated, they can be used to 
calculate the probability that Y will take on a particular value. For example, when M=6, 
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Hence, using the estimated value of Z and the assumed logistic distribution of the 
disturbance term, the ordered logit model can be used to estimate the probability that the 
unobserved variable Y* falls within the various threshold limits. 
The unknown coefficients and the thresholds can be estimated numerically by the 
maximum likelihood method, where the above probabilities are the elements of the 
likelihood function. The probability that a higher integration level is chosen increases if 
the βs are positive and the corresponding explanatory variable increases. This can be 
seen by calculating the derivatives of the cumulative probabilities: 
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Since the interpretation of the coefficients of this kind of model is unclear, a commonly 
used practice is to calculate the marginal effects associated with the probability of an 
RIA being formed or higher integration stages being established. They are given by: 
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One advantage of an ordered logit over an ordered probit model is its simplicity. 
However, it is subject to the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, 
which constitutes a tight limitation as all alternatives must follow an independent choice 
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11 
 function. Selection pairs Pi/Pj of alternative i over j are independent of whether third 
alternatives exist. The advantage of this condition is that it enables the introduction of 
new alternatives, such as new integration levels, without having to re-estimate the 
model. The difference between the estimated parameters must be the same, regardless of 
the number of alternatives that the economic agent faces. The disadvantage of this 
property is that alternatives must be perceived as distinct and independent. 
The evaluation of this type of model differs from traditional models in certain ways. 
Even though the ratio of an estimated coefficient to its corresponding estimated 
standard error follows a t-Student distribution, the F test is not appropriate for these 
models. The most commonly accepted test is the Pseudo-R2, a scalar measure of the 
explanatory power of the model derived from the maximum likelihood ratio3. This test 
is defined as: 
 
c
u
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L
log
log
12 −=ρ  (7) 
Where: Lu = the likelihood function of the model with explanatory variables. 
Lc = the likelihood function of the model without explanatory variables and only one 
constant. 
ρ2 lies between zero and one, and equals 1 when the model is a perfect predictor: 
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P takes value 0 if log Lc = log Lu, thus ρ2 increases to 1 when log Lc rises in relation to 
log Lu.  
An alternative way to evaluate the goodness of fit of an ordered logit is to calculate the 
exp (log likelihood / number of observations) which is the geometric average of P (Oj / 
                                                 
3Also known as the likelihood ratio index (LRI). 
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 Xj, estimates), where Oj and Xj are the outcome and the explanatory variables for 
observation j. This ratio shows the probability of obtaining a certain outcome 
conditional on the estimates. The higher the ratio is, the greater the explanatory power 
of the model will be. 
The interpretation of coefficients in an ordered logit model also differs explicitly from 
other models. In discrete choice logit and probit models, the sign of the coefficients 
denotes the direction of switch, but its magnitude is difficult to interpret. For example, 
the positive coefficients corresponding to the characteristics of the individuals in the 
ordered logit model estimated in this paper increase the probability that a pair of 
countries will be observed in a higher integration category. However, negative 
coefficients increase the probability that a pair of countries will be observed in a lower 
integration category. 
4. Data, hypothesis and variables 
4.1. The data 
The model is estimated with the data of 66 countries from 1999, representing over 75% 
of world trade (see Table A.1, Appendix A). Data on income are obtained from the 
World Development Indicators (2001). Distances are the great circle distances between 
economic centres. Data on capital labour ratios are obtained from the Penn World 
Tables. Data on bilateral exports are obtained from Statistics Canada (2001), and tariff 
barriers from the World Bank website. Information about geographical and language 
dummies is from the CIA (2003). The Economic Freedom Index was obtained from the 
Heritage Foundation, and the political regime, from the Freedom House. Table A.2 in 
Appendix A presents a more detailed description of data and sources. Finally, the 
agreements considered to build the dependent variable are listed in Table A.3 
(Appendix A). 
13 
 4.2. Hypothesis and variables   
According to the underlying theory described above, and in the context of the discrete 
choice model, our first hypothesis is that a pair of countries will be more likely to form 
or enhance an RIA when the distance between them is small. We specify the distance 
variable as in BB. This variable is called “natural” as it is defined as the logarithm of the 
inverse of distance between trading partners. 
A second hypothesis is that the probability of RIA formation or enhancement increases 
as the remoteness of a country or pair of countries from the rest of the world rises. For 
comparative purposes, we constructed the same remoteness variable used by BB. When 
a country is relatively far from its trading partners, it tends to trade more bilaterally with 
its neighbours, thereby increasing the probability of RIA formation. 
The third hypothesis is that the larger the economic size of the trading countries, the 
greater the probability of RIA formation or enhancement will be. RGDPij measures the 
sum of the logs of real GDPs of countries i and j in 19604.  
The fourth hypothesis is that the more similar the countries’ economic size is, the higher 
the probability of RIA formation or enhancement will be. DRGDPij is the absolute 
value of the difference between the logs of real GDPs of countries i and j in 1960. 
The fifth hypothesis is that the larger the countries’ economic size outside the RIA is, 
the lower the probability of RIA formation or enhancement will be. However, the size 
of the rest of the world (ROW) measured by the ROW GDP varies only slightly in a 
cross-section of countries and has not been included in the regression. BB obtained a 
non-significant coefficient for this variable.  
The sixth hypothesis is that the probability that a pair of countries will form or enhance 
an RIA is higher if there is a larger difference in their relative factor endowments since 
                                                 
4 Data are from 1960 to avoid the problems derived from the endogeneity of income in the estimated 
equation.  The same applies to variables DRGDPij and DKLij. 
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 traditional comparative advantages will be further exploited. However, if 
intercontinental transport costs are low, this probability may also decrease at high levels 
of specialisation. This can be modelled by adding a quadratic term to the estimated 
equation. We use absolute differences in the capital stock per worker ratio (DKLij) as a 
proxy for relative factor endowment differences, as in BB5. SQDKLij denotes squared 
DKLij.  
The seventh hypothesis is that more democratic countries display a greater likelihood of 
concluding RIAs than other countries, as stated by Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 
(2002). 
The eighth hypothesis is that a pair of countries is more likely to form or enhance an 
RIA than if they have a higher level of economic freedom and if they speak a common 
language. 
The ninth hypothesis is that interior countries (landlocked) as well as adjacency 
countries will have a higher probability of engaging in an RIA, especially with coastal 
countries. However, when a landlocked country trades with partners located in another 
continent (unnatural partner), it will have higher transport costs than a coastal country.  
Finally, the tenth hypothesis is that countries with higher levels of protection (tariffs) 
will have more incentives to create or enhance an RIA with other countries in order to 
lower (or eliminate) artificial trade barriers and to facilitate trade.  
Supplementary economic, geographical and socio-political variables are added to the 
list of variables used by BB as determinants of RIAs (hypotheses 7-10). Landlocked 
status and adjacency are added to the list of geographical variables used by BB. The 
socio-political variables considered are: tariff barriers, sharing a common language, the 
political regime (this variable takes a value of 1 when the political regime was a 
                                                 
5 Data are for 1965 rather than 1960, since data on capital labour ratios is only available from 1965 
onwards in the Penn World Tables data series. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) use data for 1960. 
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 democracy in 1950)6, and the level of economic freedom. The economic freedom 
variable takes a value between 1-1.99 for free countries, 2-2.99 for mostly free 
countries, 3- 3.99 for mostly non-free countries and 4-4.99 for repressed countries. 
According to the hypotheses above, tariffs, language and democracy are expected to 
have a positive sign, and economic freedom is expected to have negative coefficients7.   
Bilateral trade flows were initially added as an economic variable. Trade flows were 
expected to have a positive sign since more trade between countries indicates a strong 
relationship and dependence, and a reason to sign an RIA. However, due to the 
endogeneity problems found for bilateral trade, we chose to exclude this variable from 
the estimations. Magee (2003) provides one of the first assessments of the hypothesis 
that two countries are more likely to form a PTA if they are already major trading 
partners. He estimates a probit and a non-linear two-stage least squares model that 
considers trade flows to be endogenous in the second specification. Magee’s results 
show that greater bilateral trade flows significantly increase the likelihood that countries 
will form a preferential trade agreement in every specification of the model. 
The first model estimated is a binary probit; the dependent variable takes the value of 
one when the countries reach an integration agreement, and zero otherwise, and the 
independent variables are those listed above.  
The second model estimated is an ordered logit. Five different possible levels of 
integration between pairs of countries are considered to investigate the determinants of 
regional integration agreements (RIAs). The variables included are the same, but the 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients is slightly different. 
                                                 
6 Data for this variable were only available for the years 1950 and 2000. To avoid the problems derived 
from the endogeneity of democracy in the estimated equation, we used the data from 1950. 
7 Note that according to the definition of these variables, higher values imply lower economic freedom. 
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 5. Estimation Results 
5.1. Probit estimation 
The results obtained when a binary probit is estimated are shown in Tables 1 and 
2. The results in Table 1 will be comparable to those obtained by BB8, although 
the sample of countries considered is not exactly the same, the year is 1999 
instead of 1996, and the definition of the dependent variable also varies slightly. 
 
Table 1. Probit results for the probability of RIA formation. 
 
The first hypothesis to be tested is that the smaller the distance between the two 
countries, the more likely their social planners will be to form an RIA, since the closer 
the two trading partners are, the fewer their trade barriers will be. The probability of 
establishing an RIA increases with diminishing distances between the trading countries. 
BB obtain a positive coefficient (1.74) in their equivalent Model 1. We also obtain a 
positive coefficient (0.56), but it is lower in magnitude. 
The second hypothesis is tested in Model 2. For a given distance between two countries, 
the more remote the two continental trading partners are from the rest of the world, the 
more likely they will be to form an RIA. We calculate this variable according to BB and 
we obtain a positive coefficient that is similar in magnitude. 
In Model 3, the third hypothesis is that the larger the trading partners are in economic 
terms, the greater the probability of an RIA being formed will be. This effect is captured 
by RGDPij, and it is positive and significant, as expected. However, the coefficient 
obtained in this paper is lower than that obtained in BB. 
                                                 
8 Table B.1 in Appendix B. 
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 In Model 4, the fourth hypothesis is tested. The greater the similarity between the 
economic size of the two countries, the higher the probability of an RIA being 
established will be. This effect is captured by DRGDPij. We obtain the expected 
negative sign and this variable is significant. 
Finally, the sixth hypothesis is tested in Models 5, 6 and 7. According to BB, the larger 
the difference between countries’ relative factor endowments, the greater the probability 
of FTA formation will be, although this may only be true to a limited extent. Variables 
DKLij and SQDKLij (DKLij squared) measure this effect. When we include these two 
variables in the same regression, they are not significant. Since the two variables are 
highly correlated, DKLij and SQDKLij are included in Models 5 and 7 respectively. 
Both variables are significant, but they do not have the expected signs. The negative 
sign obtained for DKLij indicates that the larger the difference between countries’ 
relative factor endowments is, the lower the probability of an RIA will be. This result 
indicates that the social planners from the two countries tend to form an RIA when they 
have similar relative factor endowments. Accordingly, higher levels of intra-industry 
trade will be desirable if RIAs are to be formed, since countries with similar 
endowments trade similar commodities. This does not support the notion of “natural 
trading partners” defined by Schiff (1999) as being complementary between partners 
(one country tends to import what the other exports). A plausible explanation from the 
demand side may be that because countries with similar endowments have similar tastes 
and love variety, their governments will be more likely to negotiate higher levels of 
integration. 
BB test an additional hypothesis. The higher the absolute difference between the 
relative factor endowment of the member countries and the relative factor endowment 
of the ROW, the lower the probability of FTA formation will be, due to potential trade 
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 diversion. We construct DROWKLij according to BB, although we aggregate the ratio 
K/L rather than aggregating both variables separately9 since we do not have detached 
data for capital and labour. We use Equation (9) to calculate DROWKLij. 
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The coefficient of this variable is close to zero (0.05) and is not significant. 
Differences in the two sets of results can be explained by the different constructions of 
the dependent variable: BB consider only full FTAs or customs unions (CUs), whereas 
our dependent variable includes all PTAs, FTAs, CUs, SMs and MUs notified to 
GATT/WTO under Article XXIV and under the Enabling Clause (see Table A.3, 
Appendix A). This variable is broader since it regards integration agreements as a 
process with different levels of integration; it makes sense to estimate an ordered logit 
with this construction. 
BB use the Pseudo R2, calculated according to Equation (7) above, as a measure of 
explanatory power. However, Heinen (1993) points out that although this index is not 
affected by changes in sample size, it is affected by the presence of missing 
observations.10 In this case, a better alternative is to calculate McFadden’s R2 which 
takes the missing values into account. Table 1 shows both Pseudo R2 and McFadden’s 
R2. The McFadden statistic considers that there is a different number of observations in 
the restricted and unrestricted models when there are missing values for some variables. 
                                                 
9 Baier and Bergstrand (2004) measure DROWKLij as: 
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10 BB did not have missing observations. Therefore in the context of their empirical exercise, the pseudo 
R-squared seems appropriate. 
19 
 In the estimated Models 3-7, McFadden’s R2 is preferred to Pseudo R2 since there are 
zero values in some of the explanatory variables.  
In order to have a clear representation of the relative importance of the additional 
geographical and socio-political variables, a probit model extended with those variables 
was also estimated. The main results are reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Probit results for the probability of RIA formation: Extended model. 
 
In the first column of Table 2 (Model 5) the same results reported in Table 1 are also 
included for comparative purposes. Model 8 to Model 12 in columns 3 to 7 of Table 2 
are estimated for different sets of variables grouped as geographical (Models 8 and 9), 
economic and geographical (Model 10), socio-political variables (Model 11) and all the 
variables (Model 12). This sequential analysis enables us to find out the most important 
factors in promoting RIAs using the simple probit model. 
Models 8 and 9 in Table 2 show the results of the geographical variables. All 
geographical variables are significant at 1%, and natural, remoteness and adjacency 
have a positive signed coefficient, while the landlocked variable coefficient is negative. 
In Model 9, the interaction variable (landlocked*remoteness) is added to investigate the 
reasons why the landlocked variable is negatively signed. The estimated coefficient for 
the interaction term is positive, indicating that the probability of joining an RIA 
increases for more remote continental trading partners when one of them is landlocked. 
Geographical variables alone explain 16% of the variability of the dependent variable. 
Model 10 reports the results of adding economic and geographical variables. In this 
extended model, the dummies landlocked and adjacency are not statistically significant 
and the former shows a positive sign. Model 11, in column six of Table 2, shows that all 
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 the socio-political variables are significant: democracy, the level of economic freedom, 
the common language and higher tariffs promote RIAs formation. However, in terms of 
goodness of fit, Pseudo R2 is very low (0.05). Finally, Model 12 reports the results with 
economic, geographical and socio-political variables. In this model an additional 
interaction variable has been included (natural*language) since the effect of the 
common language dummy is only positive and significant when it is interacted with the 
“natural” variable. The adjacency variable is not significant and the language dummy 
initially showed an unexpected negative sign that reverses when the variable is 
interacted with the “natural” variable.  
 
5.2. Ordered logit estimation 
We estimate an ordered logit model consisting of a system of 5 equations with common 
coefficients for all the explanatory variables and with different constant terms. This is 
known as the proportional odds model.  
In the first column of Table 3 (Model 13), an ordered logit is estimated with the same 
variables included in Model 5 (probit estimation). Model 14 to Model 16 in columns 3 
to 5 of Table 3 are estimated for different sets of variables grouped as economic, 
geographical, socio-political variables, and Model 17 includes all the variables. This 
sequential analysis enables us to find out the most important factors in promoting RIAs. 
 
Table 3. Ordered logit results for the probability of RIA formation or enhancement. 
 
 
Model 13 shows that the results are similar in both probit and ordered logit models, 
although the logit ordered coefficients are higher in magnitude. In general terms, we can 
state that the probability of reaching a higher level of integration is higher than the 
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 probability of signing any type of RIA when no previous agreement exists between the 
trading countries. However, as stated above, there is no consensus on the interpretation 
of the magnitude of the coefficients estimated in discrete choice models. 
Models 14 and 15 in Table 3 show the results of the geographical variables. All 
geographical variables are significant at 1%, and natural, remoteness and adjacency 
have a positive signed coefficient, while the landlocked variable coefficient is negative. 
In Model 15 the interaction variable (landlocked*remoteness) is added to consider the 
ambiguous sign expected for the landlocked variable. The estimated coefficient shows a 
positive sign, indicating that the probability of reaching a higher level of integration 
increases for more remote continental trading partners when one of them is landlocked.  
Model 16, in column six of Table 3, shows that all the socio-political variables are 
significant: democracy, the level of economic freedom and the common language 
promote RIA enhancement. However, in terms of goodness-of-fit, Pseudo R2 is very 
low (0.04). The coefficient on tariffs is positive, thus showing that a higher level of 
protection increases the probability that a country pair will be observed in a higher 
category. 
Finally, Model 17 includes economic, geographical and socio-political variables. Some 
interaction terms were also added to allow for the possibility that the effect of some 
variables, namely remoteness and language, could be different for natural and unnatural 
patterns. In this model, remoteness presents a negative sign, indicating that remote 
countries have a lower probability of reaching higher levels of integration, while the 
variables adjacency, language and tariffs are not statistically significant.  
The Akaike Info Criterion (AIC) shows that the best specification is that estimated in 
Model 17, where all the variables are considered. For the specification where only 
geographical variables are considered, the AIC is lower (1.542) than that obtained in 
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 regressions including only socio-political factors (1.681). This appears to indicate that 
geographical variables are important determinants of RIA formation. 
As stated above, the interpretation of the coefficients in an ordered logit does not inform 
of the magnitude of switch since we can only state that positive coefficients increase the 
likelihood that the country pairs will be observed in a higher category, and negative 
coefficients increase the likelihood that the country pairs will be observed in a lower 
category. A preferable interpretation of the ordered logit coefficients is in terms of the 
odd ratios. The exponentiated coefficients in the logit model, shown in Table 4, can be 
interpreted as odds ratios for a 1-unit change in the corresponding variable. The 
emphasis is on the ratio “Exp(β)”, which is the odds conditional on x+1 divided by the 
odds conditional on x. For example, 1.19 means that the odds of being in a higher 
integration level increase by 1.19 if RGDP increases by 1. The interpretation can also be 
made in terms of percentages: the exp(1.49) obtained in the “natural” variable in Model 
13 means that the odds increase by 346% {[exp(1.49)-1]*100} if the variable increases 
by 1, therefore the odds of being part of the monetary union versus lower integration 
levels is 346% higher for a one-unit increase in the “natural” variable. Table 4 shows 
that, in Model 13, the most important determinant of an RIA is the “natural” variable, 
followed by remoteness (1.37), real GDP (1.19), real GDP differences (0.84) and K/L 
differences (0.77).  
We also calculate semi-standardised ordered logit coefficients that control for the 
metrics of the independent variables to see whether any change occurs in the ordering of 
effects. The option of standardised coefficients to measure the relative strength of the 
effects of the independent variables is more appropriate in the current empirical 
application since some independent variables are measured in different units. Table 4 
shows that when standardised coefficients are considered (e^bStdX), the ordering of the 
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 effects changes only slightly. In Model 13, the natural variable’s standardised 
coefficient is 3.89, and it is 1.76 for remoteness, 1.65 for RGDP, 0.75 for K/L 
differences, and 0.74 for real GDP differences. For one standard deviation increase in 
“natural”, the odds are 3.89 times greater (an increase of 289%) of countries being in a 
higher integration category when all the other variables are held constant. In Model 17, 
where socio-political variables are added, the natural variable is still the most important 
followed by real GDP and democracy. 
 
Table 4. Odds ratios for the ordered logit. 
 
In order to evaluate the probability that the dependent variable will have a particular 
value, we use cut-offs terms. From Equation (1), the threshold parameters for Model 13 
are given by: 
Yi = 0 if Y*i ≤ -3.41 
Yi = 1 if –3.41 ≤ Y*i ≤ -2.71 
Yi = 2 if –2.71 ≤ Y*i ≤ -1.8          
Yi = 3 if –1.8 ≤ Y*i ≤ -1.58 
Yi = 4 if –1.58 ≤ Y*i ≤ 0.38 
Yi = 5 if Y*i ≥ 0.38 
For example, when the trading partners are Argentina and Paraguay, we can calculate 
the probability associated with this pair of countries by computing Zi with the obtained 
coefficients in Model 13 and the corresponding data: 
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Hence for Argentina and Paraguay, the most likely outcome is that they will form a 
single market. In fact, they have been members of Mercosur since 1995. 
Our second example is Spain and France, a pair of trading partners that are members of 
the European Union. Our results indicate that the highest probability is that of the 
establishment of a single market. In 1999 these countries were already in the third phase 
of the European Monetary Union (EMU), since they fulfilled the convergence criteria 
established in the Treaty of Maastricht. However, our results most probably show that 
they were only in the EMU starting phase. 
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 When the socio-political variables are also considered (Model 17), then the threshold 
parameters are given by: 
Yi = 0 if Y*i ≤ -14.82 
Yi = 1 if -14.82 ≤ Y*i ≤ -14.01 
Yi = 2 if -14.01 ≤ Y*i ≤ -13.23         
Yi = 3 if -13.23 ≤ Y*i ≤ -12.91 
Yi = 4 if -12.91 ≤ Y*i ≤ -10.41 
Yi = 5 if Y*i ≥ -10.41 
Therefore, for the second example (Spain and France), our results indicate that the 
highest probability is that of the establishment of a monetary union. 
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The calculation of the predicted probabilities for all the trading partners11 shows that 
69% of the agreements and 84% of the non-agreements were correctly predicted by the 
ordered logit model. Of all cases, 17% had excessive bilateralism12, i.e., when the 
                                                 
11 Model 13. 
12 “Excessive” and “insufficient” bilateralism are terms used by BB. 
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 predicted level of integration was lower than the real level, and we found that 
bilateralism was insufficient for 6.5% of the trading partners. 
5.3. Marginal effects  
As BB point out, “one complication arises in estimating the partial effects on the 
response probabilities for the particular vector of RHS variables, x, in our model by 
using mean values for the levels. One of the RHS variables, REMOTE, is the product of 
a continuous variable and a binary variable (…) the mean value of this variable is 
economically meaningless”.13  
As we also use REMOTE, we estimate separately the marginal effects on the response 
probabilities with the mean value of REMOTE when the trading partners are in the 
same continent, and when REMOTE takes the value of zero (the trading partners are not 
in the same continent, they are unnatural partners).  
Marginal effects are calculated for Model 12 (probit) and Model 17 (ordered logit).14 
Our results for the probit estimation are shown in Table 5 and for the ordered logit 
estimation in Table 6. Our results in Table 5 can be compared with those obtained by 
BB, shown in Appendix B (Table B.2), although we include two additional socio-
political variables (economic freedom and trade barriers) that were not considered by 
BB. 
 
Table 5. Response probabilities for natural and unnatural trading partners in Model 12 
(evaluated at the mean level of remote and at remote = 0). 
 
Table 5 shows that the response probability of an RIA being created is much lower for 
unnatural partners (5.8%) than for natural partners (88.5%). Moreover, results show that 
                                                 
13 Baier and Bergstrand (2004), page 55. 
14 Dummy variables are not included since the mean values of these variables do not have an economic 
interpretation.  
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 a unitary increase in proximity (natural variable) increases this probability by 7.3% for 
two natural partners and 11.8% for unnatural partners. An increase in remoteness from 
the ROW of two natural partners lessens the response probability in natural partners. 
Although this is an unexpected result, Table 6 shows that the sign of this marginal effect 
changes for different levels of integration when the model estimated is an ordered logit 
rather than a binary probit model. This sign is only positive for the first two integration 
stages (PTA and FTA). When two countries are in the same continent and they are 
relatively far away from the other countries in this continent, then the probability that 
they will reach a customs union decreases with the level of remoteness. 
The results show that economic variables have a lower effect than geographical and 
socio-political factors on response probabilities, although differences in income also 
play an important role in RIA formation.  
The response probability for natural partners is similar to that obtained by BB, who find 
86.7% probability of an FTA being established between natural partners. However, they 
only obtain a probability of 1.2% for unnatural partners. We obtain a higher probability 
for unnatural partners because we also considered preferential trade agreements in the 
construction of the dependent variable. 
To compare the effect of the RHS variables across different levels of integration, in 
Table 6 we estimate the marginal effects for all the integration levels for both natural 
and unnatural partners. 
 
Table 6. Response probabilities for natural and unnatural trading partners in Model 17 
(evaluated at the mean level of remote and at remote = 0). 
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 Table 6 shows different probabilities depending on the level of integration. For each 
level of integration, the probabilities are shown for natural and for unnatural partners. 
However, for the three last categories (customs union, single market and monetary 
union) the probabilities can only be calculated for natural partners since these 
integration levels are only reached by countries in the same continent. These 
probabilities depend mainly on geographical, socio-political and economic variables, 
and their marginal effects differ across integration levels.  
On the one hand, the results obtained for natural partners (countries in the same 
continent) indicate that when remoteness increases by 1%, the probability of a PTA or 
an FTA being established increases by 337% and 159%, respectively. However, the 
probability of a customs union or a higher integration agreement being established 
decreases with remoteness. This variable, together with socio-political factors, is the 
most influential factor on the probability of an RIA being formed or enhanced between 
natural partners. 
Higher GDP differences increase the probability of PTA or FTA formation for natural 
partners, although the sign of the marginal effect for higher levels of integration is 
reversed, thus indicating that similarity of income, as expected, increases the probability 
that higher levels of integration (customs union, single market and monetary union) will 
be reached. The integration theory predicts that the costs of integration are lower when 
countries have similar levels of income and, consequently, a high level of intra-industry 
trade.  
For unnatural partners however (countries in a different continent), the inverse of 
distance is the most important factor in PTA or FTA formation, and higher differences 
in income and in factor endowments lower the probability of a PTA or an FTA being 
established. 
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 Finally, the results show the most likely outcomes are that natural partners will 
establish a single market and unnatural partners will not reach any agreement. When we 
order the probabilities for the various types of integration agreements from the highest 
probability to the lowest probability for natural partners, we obtain: 
Pr(SM or 4) = 0.38 
Pr(FTA or 2) = 0.19 
Pr(PTA or 1) = 0.17 
Pr(CU or 3) = 0.12 
Pr(MU or 5) = 0.03 
These findings can seem surprising since the (conventionally assumed) second most 
integrated type of agreement, a single market, is the most likely type of RIA. An 
explanation is that the results obtained are likely to be dominated by the European 
Common Market. 
5.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
We performed several robustness tests to validate our results. Firstly, the ordered logit 
model is based on the assumption of parallel slopes but this may be unrealistic, for 
example, if geographical variables are less relevant for higher integration levels. 
Therefore, the Brant test of the parallel regression assumption is used to validate the 
methodology used. The Brant (1990) test assesses whether or not the coefficients are the 
same for each category of the dependent variable. This produces Wald Tests for the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients in each independent variable are constant across 
categories of the dependent variable. Significant test statistics provide evidence that this 
assumption has been violated for most of the variables. With the exception of the 
capital-labour ratio, we cannot accept the equality of slopes for the different levels of 
integration (Table A.4). These results indicate that we should estimate a generalised 
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 logit model, and they suggest what variables may be used in determining the 
thresholds. We therefore estimated a generalised ordered logit for all the regressions 
presented in Table 3. In some cases, the model did not converge, especially when the 
variables with missing data (K-L differences) were included. The results15 indicate that 
the geographical variables are significant and show the expected signs for the lower 
levels of integration (PTA, FTA), whereas these variables lose significance and 
decrease in magnitude for the higher levels. In contrast, the economic and political 
variables gain importance in the higher levels of integration. 
Secondly, we re-estimated the probit and ordered logit model with an alternative data 
set taken from Magee (2003), which are available for replications on his web site. His 
dependent variable takes the value of one if the country pair has a PTA in 1998, and 
takes zero otherwise. We use the same dependent variable in the probit estimation, but 
Magee (2003) considers fewer agreements since he ignores the General System of Trade 
Preferences (GSTP), the Protocol related to Trade Negotiations among developing 
countries (PTN) and the African Common Market. Additionally, the variable 
remoteness is not included as an explanatory variable in Magee (2003). We estimate a 
binary probit for 172 countries in 1998 and our results confirm the sign and significance 
of the estimated coefficients for the income variables, the relative factor endowment 
differences and the natural variable (Model 7.1 in Table 1). Contrary to BB, the K-L 
differences variable is negative and significant, thus validating our evidence. Similar 
results are obtained when an ordered logit is estimated. 
Thirdly, we also estimated the probit model with the inclusion of bilateral trade as an 
explanatory variable and using instrumental variables to correct endogeneity problems. 
Infrastructure variables were used as instruments for trade. The results indicate that 
                                                 
15 Results are available upon request from the authors. 
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 trade is significant and has a positive sign when it is added to the list of explanatory 
variables in the probit model, confirming the evidence presented by Magee (2003) with 
different data and different model specifications. However, as stated above further 
research is needed to improve the model specification. 
Fourthly, the observations are twice the number of country pairs. However, our 
dependent variable is symmetric and only trade and tariffs are asymmetric ( jiij XX ≠ ). 
Therefore, we have re-estimated the model with only half the observations to check 
whether this would have affected the results. By taking 2145 ((66*65)/2) country pairs, 
the results remained unchanged.16 
Fifthly, an additional robustness test has been performed. We checked whether the 
results were affected by the exclusion of an important economic bloc, such as the EU. 
The results excluding the EU countries also remained unchanged.17 
Finally, the ordered nature of the dependent variable and the endogeneity of trade flows 
should ideally be considered simultaneously, although this is beyond the scope of this 
research.  
6.  The dynamics of the European Union integration process 
The EU is the best real example of a successful integration process. However, the fact 
that the analysis in the previous sections focuses on data for 1999  covers neither the 
entrance of 10 countries into the EU in 2004 nor the adoption of the Euro by Greece.18 
In order to tackle the above-mentioned issues, the proposed model has been estimated 
for an additional sample, including data for the EU-27 from 1999 to 2007. A dynamic 
analysis would also be possible by adding the time dimension to the data.  
                                                 
16 The results of taking into account the “repetition bias” in the 66-country sample are available upon 
request from the authors. 
17 These results are available upon request from the authors. 
18 A referee kindly suggested the inclusion of this section in the paper. 
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 In relation to the socio-political factors, democracy in 1950 was used in Section 5. 
Nonetheless, this variable may have very little to do with the probability of a country 
pair forming or enhancing an RIA during the period 1999-2007 in Europe. Although 
Spain and Portugal were dictatorships in 1950, both restored democracy in the mid-
1970s, and joined the European Community (EC) in 1986. Greece also restored 
democracy in the mid-1970s and joined the EC in 1981. Hence, these three countries 
were democracies at the time they joined the EC. The same applies to the former 
socialist countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. Therefore, unlike the analysis 
performed in Section 5, we take into account the political regime at the time of entry 
into the EC and not the situation in 1950. Instead of a dummy variable for democracy, 
the variable policy is used. 19 Political rights and civil liberties at the time of entry into 
the EC have also been added to the list of political variables. They are measured on a 
one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the 
lowest.20 
Table 7 shows the results obtained for the EU-27 sample. In the first column of Table 7 
(Model 18), an ordered logit is estimated with the same variables included in Model 13 
(Table 3).21 Model 19 to Model 21, in columns 2 to 4 of Table 7 report the results for 
models with different sets of variables grouped as geographical and socio-political 
variables. Finally, Model 22 includes all the variables, as does Table 3. 
 
                                                 
19 Annual data for democracy are obtained from the Polity IV dataset 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2007.xls). The variable POLITY2, which varies from -10 (strong 
dictatorship) to 10 (full democracy), is used in Section 6. 
20 Annual data on political rights and civil liberties are obtained from The Freedom House (2009): 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/CompHistData/FIW_AllScores_Countries.xls 
21 DKL is not included in the analysis for the European integration process since DKL was not significant 
in the deepest integration levels (see Table 6). Remoteness is also calculated for the European country 
sample as was done in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), however, this variable is not included in the 
regressions since is not considered as comparable to the one constructed for the 66-country sample which 
includes unnatural partners. 
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 Table 7. Ordered logit results for the probability of RIA formation or enhancement. 
The European integration process. 
 
Model 18 shows that the sign of the coefficients for the EU-27 sample is similar to the 
obtained for the 66-country sample (Model 13), although the coefficients are lower in 
magnitude. Model 19 shows the results of the geographical variables. All the 
geographical variables are significant at 1% and have the expected sign. Natural and 
adjacency have a positive-signed coefficient, while the landlocked variable coefficient 
is negative. Model 20 shows that all the socio-political variables are significant: 
democracy, the level of economic freedom (property rights and civil liberties) and the 
common language promote RIA enhancement. Model 21 includes an additional variable 
(trade barriers), measuring the bilateral weighted tariffs between trading partners before 
accessing the EU-27. Unlike the results found in Table 3, the coefficient of this variable 
is negative, showing that a higher level of protection lowers the probability of a country 
pair being observed in a higher category in the European Union integration process. 
Model 22 includes economic, geographical and socio-political variables, excluding 
democracy which correlates with the GDP. In this model, all the variables present the 
expected sign and are statistically significant. Model 23 includes a lagged dependent 
variable that indicates the previous integration level. This variable takes into account the 
fact that the probability of reaching an integration level depends on the point of 
departure (i.e., countries that do not have a previous agreement do not usually go 
straight into a monetary union). The results show that the probability of reaching a 
deeper integration level is higher if the countries already participate in an RIA. 
Finally as in BB (2004), the previous specifications assumed that RIAij is independent 
across observations. Since this assumption is not very realistic and could influence the 
estimation results, we followed the method proposed by Pesaran (2006) to account for 
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 interdependencies. This method consists in approximating the linear combinations of 
the unobserved factors by cross-section averages of the explained and explanatory 
variables and then running standard panel regressions augmented by the cross-section 
averages. This approach also yields consistent estimates when the regressors correlate 
with the factors. The results are presented in Model 24 and indicate that 
interdependencies matter (the added variables are statistically significant) but do not 
alter the sign of the estimated coefficients of the variables included in Model 22. 
As in Section 5, we evaluate the probability of the dependent variable having a 
particular value. Then we take the case of Spain and France22 in which our results for 
both the 66-country and EU-27 samples indicate that the highest probability is that of 
the establishment of a monetary union when socio-political variables were considered 
(Model 17 and Model 22, respectively). 
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The results indicate that the probability associated with level five is the highest, which 
is consistent with the fact that France and Spain were members of the European 
Monetary Union. 
 
                                                 
22 For the EU-27 country sample the probabilities are calculated in the year 1999 to be compared to those 
obtained in Section 5 with the 66-country sample. 
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper, discrete choice modelling is used to study the determinants of regional 
trade agreements. A binary probit model and an ordered logit model are estimated, in 
which geographical, economic and socio-political variables are considered as 
explanatory variables for RIA formation. Five different integration levels are specified 
for the dependent variable in the ordered logit estimation. 
The results from the probit and ordered logit estimations show that the probability of 
reaching a higher level of integration increases with income level, economic freedom, 
cultural affinities and remoteness, whereas it decreases with distance, protection levels, 
income differences and factor endowment differences. Additionally, although economic 
and geographical variables seem to be the most important determinants of RIA 
formation, the socio-political factors considered are all statistically significant and their 
relative importance in explaining RIAs enhancement increases for higher integration 
levels and for natural partners. 
The marginal effects, calculated for natural and unnatural trading partners, show that 
countries in the same continent (natural partners) will most probably establish a single 
market, whereas countries in different continents (unnatural partners) are most likely to 
not sign any agreement. This result is new in the RIA literature and should be validated 
by extending the sample to include more years and countries. The marginal effects also 
show that some variables, such as remoteness and differences in real GDP, have a 
positive influence on the formation of an RIA, but only for countries in the same 
continent and in the early stages of the integration process (PTA, FTA). However, when 
the categories considered are higher integration levels, the effect of these two variables 
is reversed. The marginal effect of economic freedom is not statistically significant for 
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 unnatural partners in the early stages of the integration process (PTA, FTA). However, 
it shows that a higher level of economic freedom has a positive influence on the 
enhancement of a RIA from a customs union to a single market and from a single 
market to a monetary union. 
The estimation of a trade equation, that considers the formation of RIAs as an 
endogenously determined explanatory variable, remains an issue for further research. 
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Table 1. Probit results for the probability of RIA formation. 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  4 Model  5 Model  6 Model 7 Model 7.1a 
Constant 
4.07*** 
(17.31) 
2.07*** 
(6.34) 
2.31*** 
(3.42) 
1.63** 
(2.41) 
2.35* 
(1.88) 
2.32* 
(1.87) 
2.34* 
(1.88) 
-0.78 
(-1.03) 
NATURAL 
0.56*** 
(20.3) 
0.35*** 
(9.55) 
0.56*** 
(11.37) 
0.54*** 
(10.64) 
0.85*** 
(8.51) 
0.85*** 
(8.53) 
0.86*** 
(8.51) 
1.19*** 
(32.63) 
REMOTE - 
0.16*** 
(9.35) 
  0.14***   
(6.65) 
0.14*** 
(6.64) 
0.16*** 
(4.40) 
0.16*** 
(4.44) 
0.16*** 
(4.32) 
- 
RGDP - - 
0.04*** 
(3.81) 
0.06*** 
 (5.75) 
0.09*** 
(6.4)   
0.09*** 
(6.47) 
0.09*** 
(6.44) 
0.11*** 
(13.87) 
DRGDP - - - 
-0.16*** 
(-9.47) 
-0.15*** 
(-5.75)   
-0.15*** 
(-5.83) 
-0.15*** 
(-5.71) 
-0.065*** 
(-3.47) 
DKL - - - - 
-0.09** 
(-2.12) 
-0.16 
(-1.38) 
- 
-0.17*** 
(-6.99) 
SQDKL - - - - - 
0.02 
(0.62) 
-0.02* 
(-1.71) 
- 
Pseudo R2 0.1226 0.1418 0.4536 0.4696 0.7797 0.7798 0.7794 0.865 
McFadden’s R2 0.1226 0.1418 0.2087 0.2319 0.4289 0.429 0.4282 0.462 
Log Likelihood -2014.167 -1969.952 -1254.244 -1217.419 -505.633   -505.485 -506.251 -1304 
Number of 
observations 
4160 4160 2756   2756 1482 1482 1482 
9045 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Z-statistics are in brackets. The 
dependent variable is a binary discrete variable that takes the value of 1 when trading partners were 
integrated into a PTA, FTA, CU, SM and MU in 1999, and 0 otherwise. The Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator of variance is used instead of the traditional calculation, therefore the estimation uses 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. a Model 7.1 was estimated with an alternative data set for a 
cross-section of 172 countries in 1998 from Magee (2003).   
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 Table 2. Probit results for the probability of RIA formation: Extended model. 
 Model 5 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
RGDP 0.09*** - - 0.10*** - 0.09*** 
 (6.40)   (4.82)  (4.51) 
DRGDP -0.15*** - - -0.14*** - -0.15*** 
 (-5.75)   (-5.64)  (-5.78) 
DKL -0.09** - - -0.15** - -0.21*** 
 (-2.12)   (-2.96)  (-3.96) 
NATURAL 0.85*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.86*** - 0.85*** 
 (8.51) (7.99) (7.65) (8.76)  (7.70) 
REMOTE 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.12*** - 0.22*** 
 (4.40) (9.24) (7.97) (3.13)  (5.50) 
ADJACENCY - 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.03 - -0.11 
  (5.03) (4.98) (0.12)  (-0.33) 
LANDLOCKED - -0.32*** -0.49*** 0.04 - 0.57*** 
  (-5.43) (-5.75) (0.25)  (4.34) 
LANDLOCKED*REMOTE - - 0.10*** 0.17** - - 
   (3.07) (2.71)   
LANGUAGE - - - - 0.36*** - 
     (5.47)  
DEMOCRACY - - - - 0.87*** 0.65*** 
     (10.96) (5.55) 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM - - - - -0.29** -0.56** 
     (-2.47) (-1.97) 
TRADE BARRIERS - - - - 0.25*** 0.54*** 
     (5.06) (4.89) 
NATURAL*LANGUAGE - - - - - 0.05*** 
      (2.96) 
Constant 2.346* 1.777*** 1.701*** 2.062* -1.431*** 1.047 
 (1.88) (5.1) (4.84) (1.71) (-7.45) (0.64) 
McFadden’s R2 0.429 0.154 0.156 0.437 0.0503 0.442 
Log Likelihood -505.6 -1941.5 -1936.7 -498.4 -1815.1 -449 
Number of observations 1482 4160 4160 1482 3540 1332 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Z-statistics are in brackets. The 
dependent variable is a binary discrete variable that takes the value of 1 when trading partners were 
integrated into a PTA, FTA, CU, SM and MU in 1999, and 0 otherwise. The Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator of variance is used instead of the traditional calculation; therefore the estimation uses 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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 Table 3. Ordered logit results for the probability of RIA formation or enhancement. 
 Model 13 Model  14 Model  15 Model  16 Model 17 
Economic variables      
RGDP 
0.18*** 
(6.89) 
- - - 
0.13*** 
(3.45) 
DRGDP 
-0.17*** 
(-3.77) 
- - - 
-0.31*** 
(-6.14) 
DKL 
-0.26*** 
(-3.34) 
- - - 
-0.30*** 
(-3.25) 
      
Geographical variables      
NATURAL 
1.49*** 
(10.95) 
0.84*** 
(12.83) 
0.83*** 
(12.54) 
- 
2.31*** 
(8.26) 
REMOTE 
0.31*** 
(6.28) 
0.24*** 
(9.35) 
0.23*** 
(8.22) 
- 
-2.21** 
(-2.40) 
ADJACENCY - 
0.49*** 
(2.87) 
0.47*** 
(2.79) 
- 
-0.08 
(-0.24) 
LANDLOCKED - 
-0.63*** 
(-5.92) 
-0.94*** 
(-5.46) 
- 
0.27 
(0.79) 
LANDLOCKED*REMOTE   
0.14** 
(2.36) 
 
0.15 
(1.48) 
NATURAL*REMOTE 
     
-0.32*** 
(-2.89) 
Socio-political variables      
LANGUAGE - - - 
0.50*** 
(4.73) 
-1.09 
(-0.43) 
DEMOCRACY - - - 
1.55*** 
(11.01) 
0.49** 
(2.32) 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM - - - 
-0.51*** 
(-2.65) 
-1.05** 
(-2.23) 
TRADE BARRIERS    
0.20** 
(2.46) 
0.14 
(0.76) 
NATURAL*LANGUAGE 
 
    
0.05 
(0.18) 
      
Cut 1 -3.41 -5.87 -5.79 1.38 -14.82 
Cut 2 -2.71 -4.9 -4.82 2.13 -14.01 
Cut 3 -1.8 -4.18 -4.11 2.56 -13.23 
Cut 4 -1.58 -3.86 -3.78 2.83 -12.91 
Cut 5 0.38 -2.64 -2.57 3.95 -10.41 
McFadden’s R2 0.3112 0.1297 0.1306 0.011 0.355 
Log likelihood -1040.8 -3198.63 -3195.60 -2967.25 -889.71 
Exp (log likelihood / 
observations) 
0.4954 0.4635 0.4646 0.4324 0.5127 
Akaike Info Criterion (AIC) 1.418 1.542 1.539 1.681 1.363 
Number of observations 1482 4160 4160 3540 1332 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Z-statistics are in brackets. The 
dependent variable is a discrete variable that takes the value of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 when trading partners were 
integrated respectively into a PTA, FTA, CU, SM and MU in 1999, and 0 otherwise. The 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used instead of the traditional calculation, therefore the 
estimation uses heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Bilateral trade, exporter’s and importer’s 
trade barriers and economic freedom are shown in natural logarithms. 
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 Table 4. Odds ratios for the ordered logit. 
  Model 13 Model  14 Model  15 Model  16 Model  17 
Economic variables       
coef 0.18***  - - - 0.13*** 
e^b 1.19 - - - 1.13 
RGDP 
e^bStdX 1.65 - -  1.43 
coef -0.17*** - - - -0.31*** 
e^b 0.84 - -  0.73 
DRGDP 
e^bStdX 0.74 - -  0.59 
coef -0.26*** - - - -0.30*** 
e^b 0.77 - - - 0.74 
DKL 
e^bStdX 0.75 - -  0.71 
Geographical variables       
coef 1.49*** 0.84*** 0.84*** - 2.31*** 
e^b 4.46 2.33 2.30 - 10.09 
NATURAL 
e^bStdX 3.89 2.10 2.08  7.95 
coef 0.31*** 0.24*** 0.22*** - -2.21** 
e^b 1.37 1.28 1.25 - 0.11 
REMOTE 
e^bStdX 1.76 1.51 1.47  0.02 
coef - 0.49*** 0.47*** - -0.08 
e^b - 1.63 1.60 - 0.92 
ADJACENCY  
e^bStdX - 1.09 1.09  0.99 
coef - -0.63*** -0.94*** - 0.27 
e^b - 0.53   0.39 - 1.31 
LANDLOCKED 
e^bStdX - 0.77 0.68  1.12 
coef - - 0.14** - 0.15 
e^b - - 1.15 - 1.17 
 LANDLOCKED*REMOTE 
e^bStdX - - 1.14  1.16 
coef     -0.32*** 
e^b     0.73 
NATURAL*REMOTE 
e^bStdX     0.01 
Socio-political variables       
coef - - - 0.50*** -1.09 
e^b - - - 1.65 0.33 
LANGUAGE  
e^bStdX - - - 1.19 0.67 
coef - - - 1.55*** 0.49** 
e^b - - - 4.69 1.64 
DEMOCRACY 
e^bStdX - - - 1.61 1.22 
coef - - - -0.51*** -1.05** 
e^b - - - 0.60 0.35 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
e^bStdX - - - 0.85 0.72 
coef - - - 0.20** 0.14 
e^b - - - 1.22 1.15 
TRADE BARRIERS 
e^bStdX - - - 1.17 1.11 
coef     0.05 
e^b     1.05 
NATURAL*LANGUAGE 
 
e^bStdX     1.18 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Odd ratios are e^b and e^bstdX. 
e^b = exp(b) = factor change in odds for unit increase in X; e^bStdX = exp(b*SD of X) = change in odds 
for SD increase in X. The dependent variable is a discrete variable that takes the value of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
when trading partners were integrated respectively into a PTA, FTA, CU, SM and MU in 1999, and 0 
otherwise. The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used instead of the traditional calculation, 
therefore the estimation uses heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Exporter’s and importer’s 
trade barriers and economic freedom are shown in natural logarithms. 
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 Table 5. Response probabilities for natural and unnatural trading partners in Model 
12 (evaluated at the mean level of remote and at remote = 0). 
Variable Yi = Pr (RIA = 1 | natural partners) = 0.885 
 
dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval 
NATURAL 0.073** 2.590 0.018 0.128 
REMOTE -1.598*** -5.020 -2.221 -0.975 
RGDP 0.001*** 4.820 0.001 0.002 
DRGDP -0.068*** -6.390 -0.089 -0.047 
DKL 0.024 1.420 -0.009 0.058 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM -0.582*** -3.450 -0.914 -0.251 
TRADE BARRIERS 0.121* 1.860 -0.007 0.248 
 Yi = Pr (RIA = 1 | unnatural partners) = 0.058 
 dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval 
NATURAL 0.118*** 6.560 0.082 0.153 
RGDP 0.000 0.430 0.000 0.000 
DRGDP -0.010** -2.270 -0.018 -0.001 
DKL -0.031*** -4.400 -0.045 -0.017 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM -0.025 -0.320 -0.180 0.130 
TRADE BARRIERS 0.127*** 4.810 0.075 0.178 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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 Table 6. Response probabilities for natural and unnatural trading partners in Model 
17 (evaluated at the mean level of remote and at remote = 0). 
 
Yi = Pr (Preferential Trade Agreement | natural partners) = 0.167 
Variable dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval 
NATURAL -0.007 -0.310 -0.047 0.034 
REMOTE 3.373*** 5.770 2.227 4.518 
RGDP 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.000 
DRGDP 0.028*** 3.880 0.014 0.043 
DKL 0.009 0.540 -0.025 0.043 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 0.762*** 5.480 0.490 1.035 
TRADE BARRIERS -0.393*** -4.670 -0.558 -0.228 
 Yi = Pr (Preferential Trade Agreement | unnatural partners) = 0.031 
 dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval 
NATURAL 0.071*** 6.950 0.051 0.091 
RGDP 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.000 
DRGDP -0.004** -2.040 -0.008 0.000 
DKL -0.019*** -5.250 -0.026 -0.012 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM -0.011 -0.270 -0.089 0.068 
TRADE BARRIERS 0.052*** 3.140 0.019 0.084 
 Yi = Pr (Free Trade Agreement | natural partners) = 0.189 
 dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval 
NATURAL -0.003 -0.310 -0.023 0.016 
REMOTE 1.587*** 2.910 0.518 2.657 
RGDP 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.000 
DRGDP 0.013*** 3.310 0.005 0.021 
DKL 0.004 0.540 -0.012 0.020 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 0.359*** 3.370 0.150 0.567 
TRADE BARRIERS -0.185*** -2.540 -0.328 -0.042 
 Yi = Pr (Free Trade Agreement | unnatural partners) = 0.024 
 dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval 
NATURAL 0.058*** 5.720 0.038 0.078 
RGDP 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.000 
DRGDP -0.003** -2.140 -0.007 0.000 
DKL -0.015*** -5.740 -0.021 -0.010 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM -0.009 -0.270 -0.073 0.055 
TRADE BARRIERS 0.043*** 4.150 0.023 0.063 
 Yi = Pr (Customs Union | natural partners) = 0.125 
 dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval 
NATURAL 0.000 0.330 -0.002 0.003 
REMOTE -0.251 -0.840 -0.835 0.333 
RGDP 0.000 -0.190 0.000 0.000 
DRGDP -0.002 -0.820 -0.007 0.003 
DKL -0.001 -0.390 -0.004 0.003 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM -0.057 -0.850 -0.188 0.074 
TRADE BARRIERS 0.029 0.860 -0.038 0.096 
 Yi = Pr (Single Market | natural partners) = 0.381 
 dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval 
NATURAL 0.014 0.310 -0.073 0.100 
REMOTE -7.104*** -6.880 -9.129 -5.080 
RGDP 0.000 -0.190 -0.001 0.001 
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 DRGDP -0.060*** -4.570 -0.085 -0.034 
DKL -0.020 -0.540 -0.091 0.052 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM -1.606*** -6.920 -2.061 -1.151 
TRADE BARRIERS 0.828*** 5.060 0.507 1.149 
 Yi = Pr (Monetary Union | natural partners) = 0.027 
 dYi/dx z-statistics 95% confidence interval 
NATURAL 0.002 0.310 -0.009 0.012 
REMOTE -0.857*** -6.180 -1.129 -0.585 
RGDP 0.000 -0.190 0.000 0.000 
DRGDP -0.007*** -3.620 -0.011 -0.003 
DKL -0.002 -0.550 -0.011 0.006 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM -0.194*** -4.540 -0.277 -0.110 
TRADE BARRIERS 0.100*** 5.090 0.061 0.138 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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 Table 7. Ordered logit results for the probability of RIA formation or enhancement. 
The European integration process. 
 
 Model 18 Model  19 Model  20 Model  21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
Economic variables        
RGDP 
0.13*** 
(16.53) 
- - - 
0.10*** 
(10.52) 
0.05*** 
(3.03) 
0.11*** 
(10.50) 
DRGDP 
-0.09*** 
(-6.13) 
- - - 
-0.11*** 
(-7.30) 
-0.10*** 
(-4.24) 
-0.12*** 
(-7.62) 
Geographical variables        
NATURAL 
0.18*** 
(6.40) 
0.21*** 
(6.38) 
- - 
0.16*** 
(4.48) 
0.12** 
(2.35) 
0.16*** 
(4.74) 
ADJACENCY - 
0.72*** 
(7.49) 
- - 
0.61*** 
(6.13) 
0.24* 
(1.92 ) 
0.61*** 
(6.02) 
LANDLOCKED - 
-1.48*** 
(-28.67) 
- - 
-0.82*** 
(-15.48) 
0.21** 
(2.40) 
-1.03*** 
(-17.87) 
Socio-political variables        
LANGUAGE - - 
1.82*** 
(8.90) 
1.81*** 
(8.97) 
1.29*** 
(7.91) 
-0.17 
(-1.28) 
1.62*** 
(10.55) 
DEMOCRACY - - 
0.96 *** 
(18.16) 
1.24*** 
(20.22) 
- 
- - 
POLITICAL RIGHTS - - 
-1.65 *** 
(-11.34) 
-1.76*** 
(-9.85) 
-1.50*** 
(-11.64) 
-0.71*** 
(-3.03) 
-2.12*** 
(-12.79) 
CIVIL LIBERTIES   
-2.12*** 
(-26.17) 
-1.47*** 
(-17.56) 
-2.23*** 
(-31.97) 
0.09 
(0.99) 
-1.50*** 
(-19.10) 
TRADE BARRIERS    
-0.50*** 
(-23.93) 
- 
-  
RIAij LAGGED      
3.79*** 
(37.23) 
 
AVERAGE POLITICAL 
RIGHTS 
     
 2.11** 
(2.26) 
AVERAGE CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 
     
 1.53*** 
(6.76) 
AVERAGE RIAij      
 1.77*** 
(20.07) 
Cut 1 1.72 -5.53 -0.46 0.82 -5.93 2.76 5.04 
Cut 2 4.54 -2.52 4.00 6.74 -2.31 10.07 8.89 
Cut 3 4.75 -2.29 4.19 6.99 -2.00 10.78 9.27 
Cut 4 6.51 -0.39 6.33 9.58 0.25 18.00 11.75 
McFadden’s R2 0.03 0.06 0.16 0.27 0.16 0.62 0.21 
Log likelihood -8521.39 -8149.07 -5549.6761 -4798.34 -7265.16 -2860.46 -6878.55 
Exp (log likelihood / 
observations) 
0.27 
 
0.29 
 
0.35 
 
0.40 
 
0.33 
 
0.61 
 
0.35 
 
Number of observations 6561 6561 5331 5272 6561 5832 6561 
Notes: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Z-statistics are in brackets. The 
dependent variable is a discrete variable that takes the value of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 when EU-27 trading 
partners were integrated respectively into a PTA, FTA, CU, SM and MU from 1999 to 2007,23 and 0 
otherwise. The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used instead of the traditional calculation; 
therefore the estimation uses heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Bilateral trade, trade barriers, 
democracy, civil liberties and political rights are shown in natural logarithms. 
                                                 
23 There are not cases of PTA. 
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 APPENDIX A 
Table A.1. 66 country sample. 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
Iceland 
India 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Kenya 
Mexico 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Panama 
Pakistan 
Paraguay  
Peru 
Poland 
Portugal 
El Salvador 
Senegal 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sudan 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tanzania 
Trinidad Tobago 
Turkey 
UK 
Uruguay 
USA 
Venezuela 
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 Table A.2. Variable descriptions and data sources. 
Variable Description Source 
Fta99: RIAs Discrete variable that takes the value 0 
when there is no agreement between 
trading partners, 1 when there is a 
preferential trade agreement, 2 when 
there is a free trade agreement, 3 when 
there is a customs union, 4 when there 
is a single market and 5 when there is a 
monetary union 
World Trade Organisation (1995, 2005) 
 
NATURAL: Natural trading 
partners (inverse of distance) 
Log of the inverse of the great circle 
distances between trading partner 
country capitals (km) 
Great circle distances between cities 
(2003) 
Authors’ calculations 
REMOTE: Remoteness Relative distance of a pair of 
continental trading partners from the 
rest of the world 
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) 
Authors’ calculations 
RGDPij: Exporter’s and 
importer’s income 
Measures the sum of the logs of real 
GDPs of the exporter and the importer 
country in 1960 (constant 1995 US$) 
World Bank (2001) 
DRGDPij Absolute value of the difference 
between the logs of real GDPs in the 
exporter and the importer countries in 
1960 (constant 1995 US$) 
World Bank (2001) 
DKLij Absolute value of the difference 
between capital stock per worker in the 
exporter and the importer countries in 
1965 (1985 international prices) 
Penn World Tables (2005)  
Authors’ calculations 
SQDKLij  Squared DKLij  Penn World Tables (2005)  
Authors’ calculations 
Adjij : Adjacency dummy Dummy variable = 1 if the trading 
partners share a border, 0 otherwise 
CIA (2003) 
Landij : Landlocked dummy Dummy variable = 1 if the country is 
landlocked, 0 otherwise 
CIA (2003) 
Langij : Language dummy Dummy variable = 1 if the trading 
partners share the same official 
language, 0 otherwise. 
CIA (2003) 
Freeij: countries economic 
freedom 
Index of Economic Freedom Miles et al. (2004) 
Demij: Democracy dummy  Dummy variable = 1 if the exporter, the 
importer or both had a democracy in 
1950, 0 otherwise. 
The Freedom House 
Xij : Exports from i to j 
 
Nominal value of bilateral exports Statistics Canada (2001) 
Tij: Countries tariff barriers 
 
Average tariff  rates unweighted in % World Bank (2005) 
Note: CIA denotes Central Intelligence Agency. 
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 Table A.3. Trade Agreements (in chronological order of date of entry into force) 
 
   Date Type of agreement and related provisions 
Salvador-Nicaragua FTA 1951 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
EC (Treaty of Rome) 1958 Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV) 
EFTA (Stockholm Convention) 1960 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
LAFTA (Latin American FTA) 1961-1979 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
CAFTA (Central American FTA) 1961-1975 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
FINEFTA 1961 Interim agreement for the formation of a FTA (GATT Art. XXIV) 
African Common Market 1963 Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Arab Common Market 1965 Interim agreement for the formation of a FTA leading to a customs 
union (GATT Art. XXIV)  
Ireland-United Kingdom FTA 1966 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Trade Expansion and Cooperation Agreement (TRIPARTITE) 1968 Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause) 
EFTA-FINEFTA accession of Iceland 1970 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations among developing countries 
(PTN) 
1973 Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause) 
EC-Accession of Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom 1973 Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV) 
EC-EFTA Free Trade Agreement  1973 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market) 1973 Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Bulgaria-Finland FTA 1975 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Bangkok Agreement 1976 Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause) 
PTA for Eastern and Southern African States 1981 Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause) 
LAIA (Latin American Integration Association) 1981 Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause) 
EC- Accession of Greece 1981 Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Israel-United States FTA 1985 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation) 1985 Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause) 
EC- Accession of Portugal and Spain 1986 Customs Union  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
CUFTA (Canada-United States FTA) 1988 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Andean Group (CAN) 1988 Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause) 
General System of Trade Preferences among developing countries 
(GSTP) 
1989 Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause) 
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) 1991 Customs Union (Enabling Clause) 
EFTA-Turkey FTA 1992 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Cross Border Initiative 1992 Common Policy Framework---PTA 
EFTA-Czech and Slovak Republic FTA 1992 Interim agreement for the formation of a FTA (GATT Art. XXIV) 
CACM (Central American Common Market) 1993 Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV) 
EFTA-Israel FTA 1993 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
EFTA-Poland FTA 1993 Interim agreement for the formation of a FTA 
Czech Republic-Slovak Republic Customs Union Agreement 1993 Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV) 
CEFTA (Central Europe FTA) 1993 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
EFTA-Bulgaria FTA 1993 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Single Market EU  1993 Single Market 
EU-Bulgaria FTA 1994 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
EU-EFTA EEA (European Economic Area) 1994 Single Market 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 1994 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
EU (Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden) 1995 Single Market (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Andean Group (CAN) 1995 Customs Union (Enabling Clause) 
EU-Israel agreement 1995 Agreement on the implementation of a FTA 
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) 1995 Single Market (Enabling Clause) 
SAPTA (South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement) 1995 Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause) 
EU-Turkey 1996 Customs Union  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Canada-Chile 1997 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
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Canada-Israel 1997 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Israel-Turkey 1997 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
CEFTA- Accession of Bulgaria 1998 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
European Monetary Union (11 members) 1999 Monetary Union 
Chile-Mexico  1999 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Bulgaria-Turkey 1999 Free Trade Agreement  (GATT Art. XXIV) 
Sources: 
WTO (2005), Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the GATT/WTO and in force 
WTO (1995) 
Baier and Bergstrand (2005) 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4. Brant Test of Parallel Regression  
    
Variable       chi2   p>chi2    df 
 
All             -336.22     1.000    20 
RGDP           18.53     0.001     4 
DRGDP         10.44    0.034     4 
DKL                8.55    0.073     4 
NATURAL  381.42   0.000     4 
REMOTE     155.06   0.000     4 
 
 
Note: A significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel 
regression assumption has been violated. 
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 APPENDIX B 
Table B.1. Probit results for the probability of an FTA. 
Source: Baier and Bergstrand (2004)  
Table B.2. Response probabilities to a one S.D. (σ) change in RHS
24
 variables for natural and unnatural trading partners. 
 
 
 
Source: Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
                                                 
24 RHS denotes right-hand side variables. 
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